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In the Suprem.e Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE TAX COMMISSIO·N OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
F. P. LINFORD, VOYLE B. BARBER 
and RAYMOND PETERSON, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
I 
I 
CASE 
NO. 7245 
The ,Utah State Tax Commission, plaintiff in this ac-
tion, appeals from a judgment of the District Court of Utah 
County sustaining defendants' demurrer to its complaint. 
Plaintiff will hereinafter be referred to as appellant and 
the defendants as respondents. 
We agree that appellant's brief substantially sets forth 
appellant's complaint, the form of bond or undertaking 
signed by respondents, respondents' demurrer to the com-
plaint and that the trial court sustained respondents" de-
murrer upon the theory that the State Tax Cnmmission 
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2 
had no authority to require or accept the type of written 
contract upon which this suit is predicated. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Appellant in its brief states that it believes that this 
case can be settled by answeri~g the following questions: 
1. Does the complaint, as stated, fail to state a 
cause of action inasmuch as it fails to allege by what 
authority appellant accepted the written undertaking 
upon which this suit is predicated? 
2. Does the appellant, State Tax Commission, 
have authority to require the type of written under-
taking upon which this suit is predicated? 
We believe that this matter can be further simplified 
and that the issue can be determined by answering ques-
tion 2 .. We feel that if question 2 is resolved against ap-
pellant, there is no need to consider question 1. 
Appellant in its brief urges two reasons why the dist-
rict courts ruling should be reversed: First because the 
undertaking sued upon is a common law obligation andre-
spOndents are liable upon the undertaking or bond signed 
by them independent of statute. Secondly that the appel-
lant has complied with the provisions of the laws of Utah 
which authorize it _to accept security. 
The first proposition was not raised or discussed be-
fore -the trial court, and as we believe the second point 
raised-by appellant-is _the crux of this whole matter, we 
prefer to direct our remarks to what appellant has desig-
nated in its brief as point 2. 
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3 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
We submit that a proper conclusion can be reached 
in this case by answering the following question: Is the 
undertaking accepted by appellant, and upon which the 
complaint is founded, the kind of security the legislature 
intended that the Tax Commission should require when it 
determines that a retail vendor may fail to remit to the 
State Tax Commission money collected by the vendor for 
the State. To answer this question requires an interpre-
tation of a part of Section 80-15-5, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. We quote the pertinent part: 
"The state tax commission, whenever it deems it 
necessary to insure compliance with the provisions of 
this act, may require any person subject to the tax 
imposed hereunder to deposit with it such security as 
the state tax commission may determine. The same 
may be sold by the state tax commission at public sale 
if it becomes necessary so to do in order to recover 
any tax, interest, or penalty due. Notice of such sale 
may be served upon the person who deposited such se-
curities personally or by mail; if by mail, notice sent 
to the last known address as the same appears in the 
records of the state tax commission shall be sufficient 
for the purposes of this requirement. Upon any such 
sale the surplus, if any, above the amounts due under 
this act, shall be returned to the person who deposited 
the security.'' 
The undertaking or bond, whatever it may be termed, 
upon which the complaint is founded is clearly not security 
that can be sold. If appellant asserts to the .contrary, why 
has it not complied with the statute and proceed to do so? 
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The section's provisions for notice to persons deposit-
ing said collateral, sale thereof, and_ disposition of any sur-
plus, would indicate a pledge of collateral with conditional 
power of sale to insure performance, and not a suretyship 
or indemnity contract. 
This court in the case of E. C. Olsen Company vs. State 
Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 Pacific Second 324, 
says: 
"The Tax: Commission is created by statute and 
has only such powers as the statute confers upon it. 
Such powers must be exercised in accordance with the 
statute." 
In that case Mr. Justice Wolfe said: 
"Where there is an ambiguity in the statute as to 
whether the latter does or does not cover a particular 
matter, a practical construction of the statute shown 
to have been the accepted construction of the agency 
charged with administering the matters in question 
under the statute will be one factor which the court 
may take into consideration as persuasive as to the 
meaning of the statute. Especially is this true where 
the agency, as in this case, is one on whom the Legis-
lature must rely to advise it as to the practical work-
-Ing out of the statute and where praGtical application 
of the_statute presents the agency with unique oppor-
tunities and experiences for discovering deficiencies, 
inaccuracies or improvements in the statute. But such 
factor - is only one among others persuasive on the 
court when it is .engaged in the interpretation _of the 
__ _ :_: .statute- and may be given much 9r little weight .in the 
-- total· consideration of the question . depending on cir-
• cumstances ·but never against the· plain meaning of the 
statute.'' 
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To like effect is Utah Concrete Products Corporation 
vs. State Tax Commission in 101 Utah 513, 125 Pacific 
Second 408, in which the Court said: 
"Defendant maintains that long compliance with 
an administrative ruling lends strength to the pre-
sumption of the regulation's validity, city State Board 
of Land Commissioners v. Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 P. 
59; In the Matter of the Estate of John Cowan, 98 Ultah 
393, 99 P. 2d 605; United States v. Missouri P. R. Co., 
278 !U. S. 269, 49 S. Ct. 133, 73 L. Ed. 322~ 323. This 
is true. However, the interpretation placed on the 
language of the statute by the Tax Commission must 
not do violence to its apparent meaning~ The construc-
tion placed here by the defendant Tax Commission on 
the Act misinterprets the meaning and intent of the 
-Legislature. It cannot be termed a "practical" con-
struction. Governmental agencies cannot deprive the 
courts of their judicial functions nor can the agencies 
extend the operation of the statute by administrative 
regulations. Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State 
Tax Commission, supra; P. H. Mallen Co. v. Depart-
ment of Finance, 372 lll. 598, 25 N. E .. 2d 43; Dun & 
Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. 198, 11 
N. E. 2d 728; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Henneford, 
D. C., 15 F. Supp. 302. 
And in Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial Commission, 
107 Utah 24, 151 Pacific Second 467, in interpreting a rul-
ing of the Commission the Court said: 
"An administrative interpretation out of harmony 
and contrary to the express provisions of a statute can-
not be given weight. To do so would it:t effect. amend 
the statute. Construction may not be substituted "for 
legislation. United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 
U. S. 269, 49 S. Ct. 133, 73 L. Ed. 322. 
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6 
"In Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Com-
missioner of Internal Rev. 297 U.S. 129, 56 S. Ct. 397, 
400, 80 L. Ed. 528, the court held that an administra-
tive regulation which was contrary to the statutory 
provision was a nullity. In so holding, the court said: 
'The power of an administrative officer or 
board to administer a federal statute and to 
prescribe rules and regulations to that end is 
not the power to make law * * * * but the 
power to adopt regulations to carry into ef-
fect the will of Congress as expressed by the 
statute. A regulation which does not do this, 
but operates to create a rule out of harmony 
with the statute, is a mere nullity (Citing cas-
es) And not only must a regulation, in order 
to be valid, be consistent with the statute, but 
it must be reasonable. (citing cases) The ori-
ginal regulation as applied to a situation like 
that under review is both inconsistent with 
the statute and unreasonable."' 
The latest case decided by this Court that we have been 
able to find is that of the New Park Mining Company, et al., 
v. State Tax Commission, 196 Pacific Second, 485, not yet 
reported in Utah Reports, follows. the rule stated in the 
cases cited above. 
We have no quarrel with appellant's argument that the 
Tax Commission has the power to sue and be sued in its 
own name, and that that power was given to enable it to 
enforce payment of taxes. The Commission is still a crea-
ture.of the Legislature, with powers limited to those gran-
ted it.- by act of that Legislature. The grant of power to 
sue::~nd be sued would not appear to be a grant of power 
generally to legislate, or to exceed those substantive pow-
ers granted by the Legislature to the Commission. 
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The Commission in its brief cites numerous cases de-
fining the term "security," and with these we take no is· 
sue. However, it will be noted that the facts out of which 
the question arises in these cases as to what is "security" 
caused the courts to give the definition in each particular 
case. In no case cited by appellant can be found a defini-
tion holding that the type of undertaking herein sued upon 
is defined as a "security." 
We believe that Section 80-15-5 was enacted in the in-
terest of the State of Utah and its people and to insure re-
mittance of the tax to the State by the vendors of mer-
chandise. Appellant seems to adopt a contrary point of 
view and argues that the .law was enacted for the benefit 
of vendors who are in precarious financial circumstances 
and that appellant in the interest of such vendors may de-
termine the type of bond that is acceptable, as well as 
who shall sign the undertaking. We confidently assert that 
to permit such practice would result in serious losses to 
the State. 
Section 80-15-5 is definite and certain as to the duties 
of appellant, and to permit appellant to place the interpre-
tation upon it that they seek to do would be to authorize 
them to legislate. No reference in the section is made to 
a bond or an undertaking. Had the Legislature intended 
that the appellant should have authority to accept a bond 
or undertaking, they would have said so; there is prece-
dent for so doing. In Section 80-10-4, Utah Code Annota• 
ted, 1943, the Legislature specifically authorizes county as-
sessors to accept. bonds. Section 80-25-49, Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, authorizes the county to accept a bond :Jn 
lieu of the payment of the taxes at the time they are as .. 
sessed. Section 80-14-26 specifically grants the tax· com-
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mission the right to require a taxpayer to furnish a bond 
where undue hardship would be imposed upon the taxpayer 
who is delinquent in his payment of taxes. 
Counsel places reliance upon a regulation which coun-
sel says appellant published effective January 1, 1944, and 
which has been in continuous effect since that time, and 
then quotes the section. As we view the issues, it makes 
little or no difference as to whether the appellant did or 
did not promulgate such an order. Surely the passage of 
the regulation which is in direct contravention of the plain 
mandate of the law cannot be given effect. To give effect 
to it would be to permit the appellant to legislate, and that, 
this Court has said they may not do. 
In view of the statute quoted above and of the authori-
ties cited ,we take the position that the appellant has de-
liberately violated the plain mandate of the law and that 
the complaint is defective and· fails to state a cause of ac-
tion. 
Point 2 
Appellant's next contention, denominated by it as point-
1, ·that the undertaking herein sued upon is good in any 
event as a common law obligation, is next considered. 
This argument may appear plausible at first glance. 
However, examination of authorities cited by appellant to 
sustain the theory that the instant undertaking is good in 
any event as a common law obligation will show that, in 
all cases wherein a bond, invalid because not complying 
with ·statutory provisions, has been upheld, there has in 
the, first -instance been. either a statutory provision for a 
suretyship or indemnity bond, or power to require such 
has been inherent, and the bond in question has simply not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
complied with the statutory provisions. Annotation, LRA 
1917B, p. 990ff. 
The Kansas City case of State ex. rei. Hendrick, Co. 
At\,~. vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 114 Pacific 
Second 812, cited in appellant's brief, p. 9, is not in point 
for the reason that the bond therein involved was required 
by a court. It is axiomatic that courts have wide discretion 
in imposing conditions upon those before it, and the Kan-
sas court so recognized in the cited case (p. 816 of report, 
headnote 7-9). The Utah State Tax Commission is not 
a court, and its discretionary power is closely hedged by 
statutory restrictions and grants of power. E. C. Olsen 
Co. vs. State Tax Commission, supra. To hold the pond in 
question in this case valid as a cornmon law obligation would 
be to give the Tax Commission by indirection powers which, 
we submit, they do not have by legislative grant, and would 
circumvent the rule against unauthorized legislative pow-
er in an administrative agency. 
The case of Central -Banking & Security Co. vs U. S. 
F. G. et al, 80 South Eastern 121, cited by appellant (Ap-
pellant's brief, p. 7) to sustain its argument for the validity 
of the undertaking herein sued upon, is also distinguishable. 
That case involves the enforceability of an administrator's 
bond taken by the clerk of the court without statutory au-
thority. That is, that case also involves the powers of a 
court in the first instance to require bonds, and the defect 
there cited was that the statutory procedure was not fol-
lowed. 
As cited earlier in this brief, in the E. C. Olsen Co. 
case, "The Tax Commission is created by_ statute- and· has 
only such powers as the statute confers upon it. Such pow-
ers must be exercised in accordance with the statute." 
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(boldface added). It is respondents' position that, the com-
mission being merely a creature of limited powers, those 
powers cannot be expanded by the commission " pulling it-
self up by its own bootstraps." It cannot achieve by indi-
rection what it is not permitted to do directly. It has no 
"inherent" powers and must exercise the powers it has "in 
accordance with the statute." A defectively executed bond 
may be upheld as a common law obligation; a bond accep-
ted when no statutory authority at all exists therefore, sup-
posedly running to an agency of limited powers, of which 
accepting such an obligation is not one, should be declared 
void. 
In the case of Territory ex. rei. Thacker, Co. Atty. vs. 
Woodring, 82 Pacific 572, 574, the Oklahoma court has this 
to say: 
"But it is contended that, if the bond is invalid 
as a statutory bond, it is good as a common law bond. 
This contention is clearly untenable. A statutory bond, 
which is void for want of authority to execute it, can-
not be enforced as a common law obligation. (cases 
cited)." 
That case involved the taking of a bail bond by the 
clerk of the court, when there was no authority to do so. 
The court held that there was no inherent power in the 
clerk of the court to take such a bond, and absent a stat-
ute, he had no such power. Appellant earnestly urges that 
the undertaking is valid under the statute. .If it ·is, as re-
spondent contends, void for want of authority in the Com-
mission to accept it, then it cannot be held valid as a com-
lJ.l.Qn.l~w obligation. 
It is respectfully submitted that the acceptance of such 
an undertaking as herein sued upon is against public policy. 
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As urged elsewhere in this brief, regardless of the recom-
mendations of appellant to the Legislature, that body saw 
fit, when acting upon said recommendations, to enact a law 
specifically providing that when appellant determined that 
a retail vendor was in a precarious financial condition, then 
the vendor be required to deposit with appellant· readily 
saleable collateral sufficient to cover the amount of the 
sales tax collected. The Legislature contemplated a sum-
mary and effective means of getting tax money collected 
into the State treasury. It did NOT contemplate tying up 
large sums of public money in the form of collected sales 
taxes in suretyship bonds, many of which might require 
protracted litigation before payment can be realized, and 
many of which, even after litigation, niight prove worth-
less. If this be so, how then, can the appellant urge the 
validity of such an undertaking as a common law obliga-
tion, even if we were to admit that appellant's authorities 
therefor were in point? 
In the case of Territory ex. r.el. Thacker, Co. Atty., vs. 
Woodring et al, supra, at page 574, the Oklahoma court, 
after holding that a statutory bond, which was void for 
want of authority to execute it, could not be enforced as a 
common-law obligation, had this to say: 
''It follows that the bond taken in this case by the 
deputy clerk of the district court is void, and there-
fore the court property sustained the demurrer to the 
petition, on the ground that it did not state facts suf ... 
ficient to constitute a cause of action." 
It is respondents' position that the undertaking herem 
sued upon cannot stand as a common law obligation; that 
it must derive its force and effect from a statutory provi-
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sion; that there is no statutory provision therefor; and that 
because of this absence of statutory authority, the com-
plaint is demurrable on the ground of insufficient facts to 
constitute a cause of action. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We submit that Section 80-15-5, Utah Code Annota-
ted, 1943, is not ambiguous or uncertain; and that it was 
enacted to protect the interests of the State and not the 
interest of vendors who might be in precarious financial 
circumstances. We further submit that the interpretation 
placed upon the above section by appellant- is out of har-
mony and does violence to the plain wording of the statute. 
Appellant urges the Court to approve the procedure 
followed by it because of hardship to vendors. The adop-
tion of such a theory by the Court, we believe, would be 
tantamount to a grant of power to appellant to legislate and 
a declaration that appellant, having fallen into error, could 
perpetuate its error_ as law. 
There was and is a total lack of authority by appel-
lant to accept the undertaking which was the foundation 
for the complaint sued upon. There being no authority to 
accept the undertaking, the instrument is void under statu-
tory provisions, as well as upon the theory of a common 
law obligation. There being no authority to accept the un-
dertaking, the trial Court was required to sustain the re-
spondents' demurrer. 
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We respectfully submit that the judgment of the Dist-
rict .Court was correct and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, SR., 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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